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Note
PLANK V. CHERNESKI: MARYLAND OPTS IN TO “OPT-OUT” IN
THE LLC FIDUCIARY DUTY DEBATE
CELINE ESMEIR*
In Plank v. Cherneski,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals considered
whether the managing member of a Maryland Limited Liability Company
(“LLC”) breached his fiduciary duties to the LLC and its minority members
by engaging in unlawful actions that exposed the LLC to potential regulatory
violations and lawsuits.2 As a relatively new business entity,3 the LLC is
surrounded by an underdeveloped legal environment,4 particularly with
regard to fiduciary duties.5 In Maryland, it remained unclear whether
fiduciary duties between LLC managing members and minority members
existed as a matter of common law6 and whether breach of fiduciary duty
claims could even be brought as independent causes of action.7 The Court of
Appeals decided the case by answering these two legal questions, holding
that the managing members of an LLC owe common law fiduciary duties to
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1. 469 Md. 548, 231 A.3d 436 (2020).
2. Id. at 564, 231 A.3d at 445.
3. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, The Naked Fiduciary, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 886
(2012).
4. See Jeffrey S. Quinn, Allen v. Dackman: Doing Away with Limited Liability in Maryland,
70 MD. L. REV. 1171, 1186 n.127 (2011) (“The case law regarding LLCs tends to be
underdeveloped because LLCs are a relatively recent creation.”).
5. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 537, 538 (1997) (“[T]he development and rapid spread of new unincorporated business
forms, including the limited liability company (LLC) . . . have not only raised many new issues, but
have also breathed new life into old ones. One of the most important of the latter is the extent to
which fiduciary duties may be waived or modified by contract.”).
6. Plank, 469 Md. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450.
7. Id. at 558, 231 A.3d at 441.
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the LLC and its minority members8 and that claims for breach of fiduciary
duty may be brought as independent causes of action.9
Even though the court recognized that breach of fiduciary duty claims
can be actionable alone—generating significant discussion by its resolution
of over two decades of conflicting fiduciary duty jurisprudence10— the more
impactful, albeit brief holding recognized common law fiduciary duties
between LLC managing members and minority members.11 By its
recognition of common law fiduciary duties in the LLC context, this
landmark case effectively generated an opt-out system in Maryland, where
default common law fiduciary duties apply unless the parties opt out of such
duties in their operating agreements.12 The court correctly recognized
common law fiduciary duties in the LLC context not only in affirmance of
precedent,13 but also because such duties comport with traditional common
law principles of equity, protect unsophisticated parties and parties with
unequal bargaining power, and serve broad policy goals for Maryland’s
business environment at large.14
However, the court’s holding should have gone further by clarifying the
extent to which parties may waive these common law fiduciary duties by
operating agreement.15 This Note calls on Maryland, either through
legislative action or future judicial decision, to allow parties to waive both
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, effectively allowing parties to waive
all their fiduciary duties.16 By affording flexibility to LLC parties within an
opt-out protectionary system, Maryland would retain its business-friendly
environment and protect itself against jurisdictional competition while also
ensuring the protection of Maryland LLCs and their minority members.17

8. Id. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450.
9. Id. at 559, 231 A.3d at 442.
10. See id. at 558, 231 A.3d at 441 (“Courts and commentators have been asking [whether
Maryland recognizes an independent cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty] for 23
years . . . .”).
11. Id. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450.
12. See Nicole M. Sciotto, Opt-In vs. Opt-Out: Settling the Debate Over Default Fiduciary
Duties in Delaware LLCs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 531, 534–35 (2012) (describing the difference
between the opt-in and opt-out systems). In “sharp contrast,” an opt-in system requires that parties
affirmatively opt in to the application of fiduciary duties in their operating agreements. Id.
13. Plank, 469 Md. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450.
14. See infra Section IV.A.
15. See infra Section IV.B.
16. See infra Section IV.B.
17. See infra Section IV.B.
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I. THE CASE
In April 2011, former professional soccer player James Cherneski
formed Trusox, LLC (“Trusox” or the “company”) to produce and sell a nonslip athletic sock.18 Trusox accepted investments from Sanford Fisher, Jeff
Ring, and William Plank, who together amassed a thirty-five percent
membership interest in the company.19 Cherneski retained legal control of
Trusox with a sixty-five percent membership interest.20 Pursuant to this
interest allotment, the three investors, Fisher, Ring, and Plank, were minority
members of Trusox and Cherneski was its managing member.21 In 2013, the
four members of Trusox entered into an operating agreement (the “Operating
Agreement”) which granted Cherneski “general authority over most
decisions relating to Trusox” consistent with his role as President and CEO.22
Trusox struggled to develop into a successful business.23 Fisher and
Plank (the “Minority Members”) grew increasingly frustrated and
dissatisfied with Cherneski’s leadership of the company.24 In June 2016, the
Minority Members filed suit against Cherneski and Trusox, alleging that
Cherneski violated the Operating Agreement and breached his contractual
and fiduciary duties to the company and its members when he engaged in
unlawful actions that exposed Trusox to potential damages claims.25 These
actions, Fisher and Plank claimed, placed their investments at risk.26
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County held in favor of the
Minority Members on the breach of contract claims.27 However, the circuit
court held in favor of Cherneski on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, citing
“insufficient evidence to show that there [had] been a breach of fiduciary
duty.” 28 Notably, the circuit court recognized Maryland’s posture on breach
18. Plank, 469 Md. at 560–61, 231 A.3d at 443.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 561–62, 231 A.3d at 443–44.
23. Id. at 562, 231 A.3d at 444.
24. Id. at 563, 231 A.3d at 444–45.
25. See id. at 564–65, 231 A.3d at 445 (“Specifically, the Minority Members alleged that Mr.
Cherneski breached his fiduciary duties by: (1) violating Maryland’s wage laws by paying
employees late on multiple occasions; (2) refusing to provide the Minority Members with
reasonable access to the Company’s books and records despite their written demand for the same;
(3) exposing the Company to liability by selling unregistered securities in violation of securities
laws and misleading potential investors by presenting inflated and unrealistic financial projections
and failing to disclose the existence of this lawsuit; and (4) violating trademark and right to publicity
laws by failing to obtain appropriate permission before using certain images and logos in
promotional materials.”).
26. Id. at 564, 231 A.3d at 445.
27. Id. at 565, 231 A.3d at 446.
28. Id. at 566, 231 A.3d at 446.
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of fiduciary duty claims—“that there is no stand-alone tort for a breach of
fiduciary duty”—but ultimately concluded that the evidence did not
sufficiently support a finding of breach.29
The Minority Members appealed to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, and after oral arguments, the panel decided that the legal questions
implicated in the case should be certified to the Court of Appeals.30 On
August 15, 2019, the Court of Special Appeals certified the matter to the
Court of Appeals with two legal questions: first, whether minority members
of an LLC may bring a stand-alone cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty against the managing member of the LLC when the managing member
engages in unlawful actions that place the investments of the minority
members at risk; and second, if so, whether such a claim is limited to
allegations supporting other viable causes of action, allegations not
supporting other viable causes of action, or unlimited by the availability of
another viable cause of action addressing the same unlawful actions.31 The
Court of Appeals granted the certification to determine these two legal
questions.32
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Plank v. Cherneski, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that LLC
managing members owe common law fiduciary duties to the LLC and its
members.33 The court further established that breach of fiduciary duty claims
can be brought as independent causes of action, clarifying over two decades
of ambiguity in fiduciary duty jurisprudence.34 Section II.A provides a
primer on Maryland LLCs.35 Section II.B examines fiduciary duties and their
common law and statutory sources in the LLC context.36 Section II.C surveys
LLC fiduciary duty law in Delaware and Nevada,37 two prominent businessfriendly states.38 Finally, Section II.D recounts the genesis of breach of
fiduciary duty jurisprudence in Maryland and pinpoints the sources of
perplexity in the case law.39
29. Id.
30. Id. at 567, 231 A.3d at 447.
31. Id. at 567–68, 231 A.3d at 447.
32. Id. at 568, 231 A.3d at 447.
33. Id. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450.
34. Id. at 558–59, 231 A.3d at 441–42.
35. See infra Section II.A.
36. See infra Section II.B.
37. See infra Section II.C.
38. See Russell K. Smith, Utah Should Adopt a Modified Version of the Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, 2013 UTAH ONLAW 12, 17 (2013) (noting Delaware and Nevada
as among the states having business-friendly LLC acts).
39. See infra Section II.D.
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A. A Primer on Maryland LLCs
An effective evaluation of LLC laws first requires an understanding of
LLC business entity fundamentals. In the most general sense, an LLC is
“essentially a cross between a corporation (for limited liability purposes) and
partnership (for tax purposes).”40 This combination has bolstered the rise in
popularity of the LLC entity as it provides members with the corporate
protection against personal liability while also bypassing the corporate
double-tax methodology, allowing individuals to pay a less burdensome passthrough tax at only the individual level rather than also at the entity level.41
To be sure of its importance, Columbia University’s past president Nicholas
Murray Butler once famously noted of the LLC, “I weigh my words, when I
say that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single
discovery of modern times . . . . Even steam and electricity are far less
important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced
to comparative impotence without it.”42
Though LLC statutes vary by state, many features of LLC law are
similar across state lines. According to the Maryland Limited Liability
Company Act (the “Maryland LLC Act”), LLCs are unincorporated business
organizations43 that are formed by filing articles of organization with the
appropriate state department.44 The owners of LLCs are called members.45
LLCs are governed by operating agreements, contracted into by the members,
which may regulate such matters as the relationship between members and
the business affairs of the LLC.46
B. Fiduciary Duties in Maryland LLCs
As a relatively new business entity, the LLC is accompanied by a
woefully underdeveloped legal framework,47 where “[u]nlike the corporate
and general partnership context, there is no statute in Maryland expressly
addressing LLC members’ fiduciary duties.”48 Though the Maryland LLC
Act does not explicitly address fiduciary duties, such duties are not born of
40. George Wasserman & Janice Wasserman Goldsten Family LLC v. Kay, 197 Md. App. 586,
615, 14 A.3d 1193, 1210 (2011).
41. Gould v. City of Stamford, 203 A.3d 525, 539 (Conn. 2019).
42. Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Colum. Univ., Politics and Business, 143rd Annual
Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924093105660&view=1up&seq=59&skin=2021.
43. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS, § 4A-101(l) (West 2020).
44. Id. § 4A-202(a).
45. Id. § 4A-101(n).
46. Id. § 4A-101(q).
47. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
48. George Wasserman & Janice Wasserman Goldsten Family LLC v. Kay, 197 Md. at 616, 14
A.3d at 1210 (2011).
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statutory language but instead arise from well-developed common law
pre-existing such statutes.49 In fact, common law fiduciary duties exist
unfettered in the corporate and partnership context unless restricted by
statute.50 In Maryland, the same is true for LLCs.51 But for LLCs, in addition
to statutory limitations, Maryland courts have interpreted the Maryland LLC
Act as permitting such limitation of duties by operating agreement.52 The
Maryland LLC Act states that “members may enter into an operating
agreement to regulate or establish any aspect of the affairs of the limited
liability company or the relations of its members.”53 As a matter of statutory
interpretation, Maryland courts have construed this language to suggest “that
provisions within operating agreements could alter existing [fiduciary] duties
or create other [fiduciary] duties that would not otherwise exist.”54
Courts have often analyzed managing members of LLCs as acting in an
agency capacity on behalf of the LLC and its minority members.55 Indeed,
where agency is defined as “the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on
his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act,”56 it
is clear that managing members are agents for the LLC and its minority
members.57 As agency is a fiduciary relationship under common law, this
categorization thereby binds managing members to common law fiduciary
duties under classical principles of agency if left unrestricted by statute or
operating agreement.58
The statutory obligations and duties of Maryland LLCs arise from the
Maryland LLC Act,59 written with the intent “to give the maximum effect to
the principles of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating
agreements.”60 A provision written into numerous state statutes, this
“maximum effect” language functions to prioritize the role of party
contracting and to delineate such freedom of contracting to parties

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id., 14 A.3d at 1210–11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 616, 14 A.3d at 1211.
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS, § 4A-402(a) (West 2020).
Wasserman, 197 Md. at 616, 14 A.3d at 1211.
Id., 14 A.3d at 1210.
Green v. H.R. Block, Inc., 355 Md. 488, 503, 735 A.2d 1039, 1047 (1999) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958)).
57. Wasserman, 197 Md. at 616, 14 A.3d at 1210.
58. Id.
59. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A (West 2020).
60. Id. § 4A-102(a).

1308

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1302

uninhibited by burdensome state-imposed restrictions and laws.61 Placing
significant emphasis on the party-contracted terms of operating agreements,
the LLC Act does not specify what, if any, fiduciary duties exist in the LLC
context.62 With the Maryland LLC Act silent on fiduciary duties, such duties
are unrestricted by statute.63 However, LLC fiduciary duties may still be
precluded by operating agreement,64 though the extent to which these duties
may be altered or waived by such operating agreement in Maryland remains
unanswered by statute or by case law.
C. Fiduciary Duties in Delaware and Nevada LLCs
To contextualize Maryland’s LLC laws, this Section explores the LLC
legal landscape in the renowned business-friendly states of Delaware and
Nevada.65 In Delaware, LLC fiduciary duties are largely demarcated by
statute.66 The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “Delaware LLC
Act”) allows parties to limit or eliminate breach of fiduciary duties by way
of operating agreement, barring only the elimination of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.67 Despite the Delaware LLC Act’s clarity on
elimination, a question of scope persisted: whether fiduciary duties existed
by default in the Delaware LLC context, or in other words, whether a
Delaware LLC with an operating agreement silent on fiduciary duties was
bound to such duties.68 The Delaware Supreme Court declined to answer this
question during the infancy of the Delaware LLC Act, punting the inquiry to
the state’s legislature.69 A year after the Delaware LLC Act’s enactment,
Delaware’s legislature amended the Delaware LLC Act with a clarifying
sentence, that “[i]n any case not provided for in this chapter, the rules of law
and equity, including the rules of law and equity relating to fiduciary duties
and the law merchant, shall govern.”70 This amendment, and subsequent
court interpretations, solidified the presence of default fiduciary duties in
Delaware.71 To summarize, there are default fiduciary duties in the Delaware

61. See, e.g., In re Grupo Dos Chiles, LLC, No. 1447-N, 2006 WL 668443, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 10, 2006) (“Limited liability companies are designed to afford the maximum amount of
freedom of contract, private ordering and flexibility to the parties involved.”).
62. Wasserman, 197 Md. at 616, 14 A.3d at 1211.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 38.
66. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 (West 2013).
67. Id. § 18-1101.
68. Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga Capital Corporation, 59 A.3d 1206, 1219 (Del. 2012).
69. Id.
70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1104 (West 2013).
71. Id.
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LLC context but parties may limit or eliminate such duties affirmatively by
way of operating agreement.
Nevada, on the other hand, recognizes no such default fiduciary duties
in the LLC context. The statutory language in Nevada provides that the
duties of LLC managing members are limited only to the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and to “[s]uch other duties, including,
without limitation, fiduciary duties, if any, as are expressly prescribed by the
articles of organization or the operating agreement.”72 This 2019 update was
subsequently interpreted by Nevada courts to mean that no fiduciary duties
should be imposed upon LLCs, except the implied contractual covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, unless such duties are specifically written into the
LLC’s operating agreement.73 Thus, parties to a Nevada LLC may agree to
contract into fiduciary duties by operating agreement, but when an operating
agreement is silent on fiduciary duties, the parties remain unbound.74 This
yields a technical but significant distinction between Delaware and Nevada
LLC fiduciary duty law: Parties that wish to be bound by fiduciary duties
must actively insert fiduciary duties in a Nevada LLC agreement, while such
duties exist by default in a Delaware LLC agreement.75
D. The Genesis of Maryland Breach of Fiduciary Duty Case Law and
Subsequent Interpretations
In Maryland’s seminal breach of fiduciary duty case, Kann v. Kann,76 a
trustee filed a complaint against his father’s surviving spouse and beneficiary
seeking a declaration of the rights and obligations of parties with respect to
misappropriated funds.77 The beneficiary brought a counterclaim, alleging
breach of fiduciary duty by way of the trustee’s conflicting roles as personal
representative of his father’s estate and trustee of his father’s trust.78 The
beneficiary argued that the Court of Appeals should “substantially alter
existing Maryland law by declaring that a breach of any fiduciary duty
constitutes a tort.”79 However, the Court of Appeals rejected the
72. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.298 (West 2019).
73. Israyelyan v. Chavez, No. 78415, 2020 WL 3603743, at *4 (Nev. July 1, 2020) (“The
Legislature’s use of ‘if’ supports our interpretation of the statutory scheme as a whole: that while
members of an LLC can contract to fiduciary duties, such duties do not necessarily exist otherwise,
aside from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”).
74. Id.
75. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (West 2013), with NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
86.298 (West 2019) (showing that while Delaware recognizes default fiduciary duties in LLC
operating agreements, Nevada does not).
76. 344 Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997).
77. Id. at 695, 690 A.2d at 512.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 706, 690 A.2d at 517.
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beneficiary’s contentions for “wholesale changes in Maryland law” and held
that “there is no universal or omnibus tort for the redress of breach of
fiduciary duty by any and all fiduciaries.”80 Yet, the court added, “[t]his does
not mean that there is no claim or cause of action available for breach of
fiduciary duty,”81 in order to promote case-by-case consideration by courts
analyzing breach of fiduciary duty claims.82
Under Kann, Maryland courts proceeded to recognize “independent
claims for breach of fiduciary duty in various contexts,” including between
partners and between shareholders and directors.83 Yet, uncertainty in
Maryland’s jurisprudence remained by way of two conflicting footnotes.
Despite consistent case law to the contrary,84 the Court of Appeals in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Willis Corroon Corporation of
Maryland85 provided that under Kann, “although the breach of a fiduciary
duty may give rise to one or more causes of action, in tort or in contract,
Maryland does not recognize a separate tort action for breach of fiduciary
duty.”86 However, seven years later, in yet another footnote, the Court of
Appeals in Shenker v. Laureate Education, Inc.87 maintained “that breach of
fiduciary duties is a cognizable tort in Maryland.”88 In complete confliction,
Teamsters recognized no independent cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty while Shenker noted that breach of fiduciary duties may actually stand
as independent tort actions.89 Accordingly, “[t]hese footnotes created
problems for courts attempting to understand Kann and to follow the outlined

80. Id. at 713, 690 A.2d at 520–21.
81. Id. at 713, 690 A.2d at 521.
82. Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 592, 231 A.3d 436, 462 (2020).
83. Id. at 583–84, 231 A.3d at 457 (citing Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Miller, 362 Md. 361, 765 A.2d
587 (2001)) (identifying and permitting a breach of fiduciary duty claim arising between an insurer
and an agent under principles of agency); see, e.g., Della Ratta v. Larkin, 382 Md. 553, 856 A.2d
643 (2004) (upholding the circuit court’s injunction based on a breach of fiduciary duty claim arising
in the partnership context); Shenker v. Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, 983 A.2d 408 (2009)
(holding that shareholders could pursue direct claims against directors for breach of common law
fiduciary duties).
84. Plank, 469 Md. at 584, 231 A.3d at 457.
85. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Willis Corroon Corp. of Md., 369 Md. 724, 802 A.2d
1050 (2002).
86. Id. at 727 n.1, 802 A.2d at 1051 n.1.
87. Shenker, 411 Md. at 317, 983 A.2d at 408.
88. Id. at 351 n.16, 983 A.2d at 428 n.16.
89. Compare Teamsters, 369 Md. at 727 n.1, 802 A.2d at 1051 n.1, with Shenker, 411 Md. at
351 n.16, 983 A.2d at 428 n.16.

2022]

PLANK V. CHERNESKI

1311

analysis,”90 both in the Court of Special Appeals91 and in federal court.92 The
conflicting language in Kann combined with the contradictory footnotes
provided in Teamsters and Shenker left fiduciary duty law in Maryland in
disarray.93
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
The Maryland Court of Appeals granted the certification to provide
clarity on twenty-three years of ambiguity in Maryland jurisprudence as to
whether breach of fiduciary duty may be actionable as an independent cause
of action.94 The court held in the affirmative, finding that breach of fiduciary
duty can stand alone as an independent cause of action where the plaintiff
demonstrates the existence of a fiduciary relationship, a breach of the duty
owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary, and harm to the beneficiary.95 In
arriving at this decision, the court further recognized that managing members
of Maryland LLCs owe fiduciary duties to the LLC and to all other members
as a matter of common law principles of agency.96
The Court of Appeals had not previously decided whether a managing
member of an LLC owes common law fiduciary duties to its minority
members.97 The court began its analysis asserting that fiduciary duties may
arise in one of three ways: by contract, by statute, or by common law.98 The
court analyzed these possibilities in turn, beginning with the operative
contract, the Operating Agreement,99 and the relevant statute, the Maryland
LLC Act.100 However, the court found both the Operating Agreement and
the Maryland LLC Act silent as to whether managing members owed
fiduciary duties to minority members.101 With no contractual or statutory
provision establishing fiduciary duties between Cherneski and the Minority
90. Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 584, 231 A.3d 436, 457 (2020).
91. Id. at 585, 231 A.3d at 458 (“[T]he intermediate appellate court has ‘held in some cases that
there is no stand-alone claim for breach of fiduciary duty; in others that such a cause of action may
exist, but only for equitable relief; and yet in others that such a cause of action may exist, without
necessarily restricting the type of relief available.’”).
92. Id. at 589, 231 A.3d at 460 (“[F]ederal judges also have been understandably inconsistent
in their efforts to reconcile ‘a split of authority . . . as to whether the Court of Appeals rejected
breach of fiduciary duty as an independent tort.’” (citation omitted)).
93. Teamsters, 369 Md. at 727 n.1, 802 A.2d at 1051 n.1; Shenker, 411 Md. at 351 n.16, 983
A.2d at 428 n.16.
94. Plank, 469 Md. at 558, 231 A.3d at 441.
95. Id. at 599, 231 A.3d at 466.
96. Id. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 571–72, 231 A.3d at 449–50.
99. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
100. Plank, 469 Md. at 571–74, 231 A.3d at 449–51.
101. Id.
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Members, the court resorted to the final possibility and analyzed whether
such fiduciary relationships exist under common law.102 Relying primarily
on George Wasserman & Janice Wasserman Goldsten Family LLC v. Kay,103
the court clarified its stance on whether such fiduciary relationships exist and
held, based on principles of agency, that managing members of an LLC do
owe common law fiduciary duties to the LLC and to the other members.104
Under principles of common law agency, a fiduciary duty arises implicitly,
as “[m]anaging members are clearly agents for the LLC and each of the
members, which is a fiduciary position under common law.”105
Underpinning the court’s analysis is an understanding that managing
members of an LLC are agents for the LLC and its members.106 This
principal-agency relationship to which the court drew a parallel is a fiduciary
position under common law.107 Therefore, the court held that Cherneski, as
Trusox President, CEO, and majority interest member, owed fiduciary duties
to the Minority Members under common law principles of agency.108
After establishing that a fiduciary relationship does exist between LLC
managing members and minority members, the court addressed whether
Maryland law recognizes breach of fiduciary duty as an independent cause
of action and, if so, what limits exist on the cause of action.109 The court
categorized the conflicting footnotes in Teamsters and Shenker as dicta and
clarified that breach of fiduciary duty may indeed be actionable as an
independent cause of action.110 To establish breach of fiduciary duty as an
independent cause of action, the court explained that a plaintiff must show
the existence of a fiduciary relationship, a breach of the duty owed by the
fiduciary to the beneficiary, and harm to the beneficiary.111
The Court of Appeals held that breach of fiduciary duty claims may
stand alone as independent causes of action in Maryland.112 In doing so, the
court ultimately upheld the holding of the lower court, reasoning that the
102. Id.
103. 197 Md. App. 586, 616, 14 A.3d 1193, 1210 (2011) (explaining that because no Maryland
statute precludes, or even limits, managing members’ fiduciary duties under common law, those
underlying duties apply).
104. Plank, 469 Md. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450.
105. Wasserman, 197 Md. App. at 616, 14 A.3d at 1210 (citing Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Miller, 362
Md. 361, 765 A.2d 587 (2001)).
106. See Plank, 469 Md. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450 (“For the reasons so aptly explained in
Wasserman, we join these courts and hold that managing members of an LLC owe common law
fiduciary duties to the LLC and to the other members based on principles of agency.”).
107. Wasserman, 197 Md. App. at 616, 14 A.3d at 1210.
108. Plank, 469 Md. at 573–74, 231 A.3d at 450.
109. Id. at 574, 231 A.3d at 451.
110. Id. at 594, 231 A.3d at 463.
111. Id. at 559, 231 A.3d at 466.
112. Id. at 626, 231 A.3d at 482.
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circuit court’s resolution of the breach of fiduciary duty claim was based
upon a factual determination that there was no breach, unrelated to any legal
analysis or interpretation of whether an independent cause of action
existed.113 Agreeing with the circuit court’s factual determination finding no
breach of fiduciary duty, the Court of Appeals concluded that the circuit court
did not err in entering judgment in favor of Cherneski on the breach of
fiduciary duty count.114
IV. ANALYSIS
In Plank v. Cherneski, Maryland’s highest court held that breach of
fiduciary duty may be brought as an independent cause of action (the “breach
of fiduciary duty holding”).115 The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that
managing members of an LLC owe fiduciary duties to the LLC and its
minority members (the “default fiduciary duty holding”).116 While
appreciating the importance of the breach of fiduciary duty holding on LLC
law in Maryland, this Part focuses primarily on the default fiduciary duty
holding.
The Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged default fiduciary duties
in the LLC context because such default duties comport with traditional
common law principles of equity, protect unsophisticated parties and parties
with unequal bargaining power, and serve broad policy goals in the state’s
business environment at large.117 However, the court’s default fiduciary duty
holding should have gone further by specifying the extent to which parties
may waive their default fiduciary duties by operating agreement.118 Moving
forward, it is important that the Court of Appeals or the Maryland General
Assembly clarifies this extent. This Note proposes that Maryland allow
parties to waive their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in order to retain a
business-friendly environment that protects Maryland against jurisdictional
competition, while simultaneously protecting LLCs and their minority
members with an equitable judicial backdrop.119 This Part will proceed in
two Sections. First, Section IV.A will discuss the legal accuracy of the
court’s default fiduciary duty holding, while also outlining supporting policy
arguments.120 Then, Section IV.B will explore the rationale underpinning the

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 559, 231 A.3d at 442.
Id. at 572, 231 A.3d at 450.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.A.
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ability of parties to waive their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in the
context of an LLC operating agreement.121
A. Plank’s Default Fiduciary Duty Holding Was Correctly Decided
While freedom of contract is integral to the hailed flexibility of the
LLC,122 courts have often grappled with striking a balance between this
flexibility and judicially injected fiduciary duties.123 Though some argue that
“‘intrusive’ judicial doctrine” is unnecessary in a setting where parties have
“such a broad ability to privately order their affairs,”124 some jurisdictions
have nevertheless recognized default fiduciary duties.125 Succeeding Plank,
Maryland is one of these jurisdictions.126 The alternative is a jurisdiction like
Nevada, where no default fiduciary duties are recognized, leaving parties to
shoulder the responsibility of explicitly contracting into such duties by
operating agreement.127
Moving forward, this Note will use the terms “opt-in” and “opt-out” to
refer to two main approaches of imposing fiduciary duties on LLCs.128 Optin states, such as Nevada, require parties who wish to be bound by fiduciary
duties to include a clause in their operating agreements affirmatively
contracting into such duties.129 By contrast, in opt-out states, such as
Delaware, and most recently Maryland, default common law fiduciary duties
apply to the parties of the agreement unless the parties include a clause in
their operating agreements removing such duties.130 Put simply, parties to an
operating agreement silent on fiduciary duties will not be held to fiduciary
duties in an opt-in state, but the same parties will be held to common law
fiduciary duties in an opt-out state.131 This Section will argue why an opt121. See infra Section IV.B.
122. Peter Molk, Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility, 51 U.C.D. L. REV.
2129, 2131 (2018); Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 88 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“[A] principle attraction of
the LLC form of entity is the statutory freedom granted to members to shape, by contract, their own
approach to common business ‘relationship’ problems.”).
123. Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need
for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1609, 1613 (2004).
124. Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not)
From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 958 (2005).
125. See supra text accompanying note 71.
126. Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 231 A.3d 436 (2020).
127. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.298 (West 2019) (“The duties of a manager or managing
member . . . are only: (1) [t]he implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2)
[s]uch other duties, including, without limitation, fiduciary duties, if any, as are expressly prescribed
by the articles of organization or the operating agreement.”).
128. Sciotto, supra note 12, at 535.
129. Id. at 534–35.
130. Id. at 535.
131. Id. at 534–35.
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out system is preferable and explain how the Court of Appeals in Plank
correctly maintained a minimum “threshold level of mandatory fiduciary
duty.”132
1. Common Law Principles of Equity Necessitate Default
Fiduciary Duties
The arguments for and against default fiduciary duties split along the
lines of traditionalists and contractarians.133 Traditionalists are proponents
of default fiduciary duties, “focusing on the extracontractual nature of
fiduciary duties, their grounding in equity, and their foundational doctrinal
existence in business law.”134 On the other hand, contractarians see no room
for default fiduciary duties, arguing that LLC agreements should be treated
as pure contracts, leaving intact only the provisions contracted into by
parties.135
While the contractarian argument is tempting, given that LLCs are
primarily creatures of contract, the fiduciary relationship that underlies the
association between LLC members is not purely contractual,136 and though
“LLC statutes are relatively new . . . abusive conduct is not.”137 Indeed,
fiduciary duties are engrained in common law principles of equity and aimed
at alleviating the “perennial” potential for abuse of delegated power present
in relationships where one is entrusted with the assets of another.138 It is
self-evident how LLCs fit into this framework, as managing members are
responsible for the assets of their fellow members and of the LLC. Thus, the
“legal reality is that the manager of an LLC . . . is in a fiduciary relationship,”
and to label the relationship otherwise would be a “significant departure from
[the] established doctrine” founded in equity.139 The resulting implication is
best captured by Professor Daniel Kleinberger, who aptly explains:
Once courts stop thinking about managers as handling other
people’s money, the way is open to abandon “the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive” and decay into “the morals of the market
place.” . . . “[D]og eat dog” among firms may make for a

132. Harner & Marincic, supra note 3, at 883.
133. Sciotto, supra note 12, at 534–35.
134. Winnifred A. Lewis, Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and
Limited Liability Companies, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1044 (2013).
135. Id. at 1046.
136. See Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TULSA L.
REV. 451, 458 (2006) (“[T]ransforming fiduciary obligations into waivable contractual terms is
simply inconsistent with a long-standing understanding of what fiduciary duties are.”).
137. Miller, supra note 123, at 1612.
138. Dibadj, supra note 136, at 451.
139. Lewis, supra note 134, at 1045 (footnote omitted).
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competitive market. “Dog eat dog” within an entity undercuts
capitalism.140
There are other fallacies underlying the contractarian argument that will
be discussed in the following sections. For example, to treat LLC formation
as purely contractual rests on an idealistic assumption of the contract
formation process where all parties are sophisticated and have equal
bargaining power.141 By the same token, the contractarian argument ignores
the persisting need for regulating managerial conduct, an issue exacerbated
by the lack of market regulation because LLCs are largely privately held and
are not required to disclose audited financial statements.142 Further, without
a developed capital market with share prices143 and reputational concerns144
to keep management held to some standard, LLCs generally lack the “market
constraints on opportunistic conduct” that limit opportunism in larger
ventures.145 Even more, the contractarian approach effectuates worrisome
public policy in the business environment at large because it disregards
necessary limitations on managerial control and contributes to an already
imbalanced dynamic between managing members and minority members
where the often unequal bargaining power produces an inherently unfair
contract formation process.146
2. Default Fiduciary Duties Protect Unsophisticated Parties and
Parties with Unequal Bargaining Power
While the LLC entity provides parties with great contracting flexibility,
the mere “ability to contract does not necessarily translate into the actual
occurrence of effective contracting.”147 Indeed, “[f]iduciary duties are
perhaps best understood as a response to the impossibility of contracting for
all contingencies due to limited information and high transaction costs.”148 A

140. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Delaware Dissolves the Glue of Capitalism: Exonerating from
Claims of Incompetence Those Who Manage Other People’s Money, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
737, 767 (2012) (footnote omitted).
141. See infra Section IV.A.2.
142. Miller, supra note 123, at 1619.
143. Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Preludes: Likely Issues for LLCs, 66 U. COLO. L. REV.
1043, 1044 n.3 (1994) (“The opportunism of a smaller enterprise may not be communicated as
quickly, or as readily, as that of an enterprise tied to underwriters, stock analysts and other
participants in public capital markets who collect, process and disseminate information.”).
144. Id. (explaining that “anticipated impact on reputation” is a weaker constraint on
opportunistic behavior in smaller enterprises because bad reputations in such a context do not limit
the enterprise’s access to public capital markets).
145. Id. at 1044.
146. See infra Section IV.A.3.
147. Moll, supra note 124, at 960–61.
148. H. Justin Pace, Contracting Out of Fiduciary Duties in LLCs: Delaware Will Lead, but Will
Anyone Follow?, 16 NEV. L.J. 1085, 1086 (2016).
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variety of factors may hinder effective bargaining, including lack of
sophistication, over-trusting family and friends, lack of foresight,149 and
optimism bias.150 Further, “involuntary” owners—individuals that receive
ownership interests through gift or inheritance—are absent during initial
contracting and thus are left without any bargaining power.151
Contract law often differentiates between sophisticated parties and
unsophisticated parties.152 It presumes that sophisticated parties know what
to bargain for, can read and understand the terms of a written agreement, and
can negotiate competently.153 Contractarians base much of their argument on
the assumption that only sophisticated parties enter into LLCs.154 So, the
argument goes, these sophisticated parties are able to tailor their operating
agreements according to their business needs.155 This assumption necessarily
relies on a further supposition of a level playing field that permits free
bargaining and effective contracting.156 Yet, the research indicates that there
is a lack of sophistication and free bargaining in the drafting of LLC operating
agreements.157
A 2006 survey found that forty percent of LLCs were formed without
an operating agreement,158 indicating a lack of sophistication. Further, small
businesses are increasingly being formed as LLCs using online, ready-made
forms.159 These “one-size-fits-all” forms are regularly inadequate at
capturing the individual needs of a new business and can lead to the
acceptance or waiver of crucial provisions by unsophisticated or unwary
business owners.160 For example, RocketLawyer provides a free LLC
149. Moll, supra note 124, at 961.
150. See Sandra K. Miller, The Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual
Freedom in Alternative Business Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 295, 323 (2014) (defining optimism bias
as “a cognitive bias under which people underestimate the likelihood of their own risks of an adverse
event taking place”).
151. Moll, supra note 124, at 961–62.
152. See Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75
MO. L. REV. 493, 494 (2010) (“Courts mention party sophistication in determining whether the
parties intended to form a contract and what they meant by the terms they used. They determine
the enforceability of reliance disclaimers, exculpatory clauses and liquidated damages provisions
based, at least in part, on party sophistication.” (footnotes omitted)).
153. Id. at 495.
154. See, e.g., Arby Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1063 (Del. Ch.
2006) (“In the alternative entity context . . . it is more likely that sophisticated parties have carefully
negotiated the governing agreement . . . .”).
155. Sciotto, supra note 12, at 545.
156. Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 417, 454 (1995).
157. See infra notes 158–165 and accompanying text.
158. Miller, supra note 150, at 322–23.
159. Derek Terry, The Pitfalls of Fiduciary Duty Waivers in Do-it-Yourself LLC Formation, 20
TENN. J. BUS. L. 1001, 1002 (2019).
160. Id.

1318

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1302

operating agreement that alarmingly automatically waives the fiduciary
duties of members.161
Studies have also revealed the prevalence of unequal bargaining power,
finding that managers often have substantial leverage in setting the terms of
operating agreements162 and that majority members of LLCs are more likely
to have legal representation than minority members.163 Moreover, a study by
Professor Peter Molk revealed that LLCs with vulnerable minority owners
actually adopt considerably fewer owner safeguards than LLCs with more
sophisticated owners.164 This suggests that “LLCs may instead be using their
contractual freedom to set up later opportunism by managers and majority
owners.”165
When LLCs are formed without operating agreements, parties never
have the chance to contract into (or out of) of fiduciary duties.166 Even when
an operating agreement is drafted, minority members often lack the ability to
contract into their preferred provisions due to unequal bargaining power,
amplified not only by their more junior organizational position, but also by
their lack of legal representation.167 When minority members lack legal
representation, their already attenuated position is exacerbated, spreading the
bargaining power imbalance even wider.168 Finally, the rise of ready-made
LLC agreements may lead to the unintended or invalid waiver of fiduciary
duties, which could result in unsophisticated parties creating operating
agreements with inadvertent consequences or agreements that are wholly
unenforceable in court.169 Particularly to unsophisticated, uncounseled
parties, the “LLC in ten minutes” model of these online platforms fails to
“impart to the start-up owner the importance of considering and negotiating
an operating agreement.”170

161. Id. at 1003–04.
162. See, e.g., Harner & Marincic, supra note 3, at 924 (finding a relationship between duty
waivers and pro-management rights like indemnification in operating agreements).
163. Miller, supra note 150, at 322.
164. Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J.
CORP. L. 503, 507 (2017).
165. Id.
166. See Miller, supra note 150, at 324 (explaining that where the vast majority of LLCs are
formed without operating agreements or with “simple, no-frills agreements,” the default
environment becomes increasingly important).
167. Id. at 322.
168. Sandra K. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the
Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Parties, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 243, 262 (2009) (explaining
that “possible inequalities in legal representation between controlling and noncontrolling LLC
investors” may contribute to “inequalities in the contractual playing field”).
169. Terry, supra note 159, at 1004.
170. Id.
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Not only do these concerns regarding party sophistication and
bargaining power draw into question the contractarian assumption of
sophisticated and free bargaining, but they also make particularly salient a
state’s default rules when inefficient bargaining occurs.171 Indeed, these
issues demand default fiduciary duties to protect a range of parties that
contract into LLCs.172 These parties include: parties that fail to create an
operating agreement during business formation, involuntary owners that are
not present during the initial contracting period, parties that create fill-in-theblank agreements online, parties that are unable to effectuate their wants and
needs into an operating agreement due to weak bargaining power or lack of
sophistication, and parties that lack legal representation.173 To not protect
these members would be to turn a blind eye to the real possibility that when
“LLCs modify default owner protections, it may on average be more with an
eye to potential undesirable opportunism, rather than in pursuit of economic
efficiency.”174
3. Public Policy Goals are Effectuated by Default Fiduciary Duties
From a public policy perspective, fiduciary duties incentivize “honesty,
good faith, prudence, and care.”175 A system with no default fiduciary duties
may be understood as implicitly incentivizing the opposite, motivating selfinterested practices over the obligations of a fiduciary to act on behalf of
others and the business itself.176 It is in the best interest of the business
environment at large to incentivize integrity, where managers, who often
exercise control over the assets of others, are held to a vigorous standard of
honesty and reliability.177 First, a robust business environment hinges on
investment, which itself necessarily hinges on an intrinsic trust in the
business environment.178 How this trust might be fostered in a system that
does not recognize default fiduciary duties is difficult to imagine. Second,
managerial responsibility is fundamental to healthy businesses, which is the
foundation of a strong business marketplace.179 Therefore, contractual

171. Miller, supra note 150, at 324.
172. Terry, supra note 159, at 1006.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 166–167.
174. Molk, supra note 164, at 557.
175. Michael Despres, Alternative Entities and Fiduciary Duty Waivers in Delaware, 2015 BYU
L. REV. 1347, 1373 (2015).
176. Id.
177. See Sandra K. Miller, The Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While
Minimizing Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 132 (2008) (“The ultimate goal is to foster
investor confidence through a legal regime that creates and enforces reasonable expectations of
responsible management conduct.”).
178. Id.
179. Kleinberger, supra note 140, at 738–39.
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freedom must be balanced with “the need to constrain opportunistic and
deceptive conduct through the development of a minimum mandatory core
of acceptable business conduct.”180
Fiduciary duties serve to encourage fiduciary relationships while
reducing the risks associated with such relationships where one party has
control over the assets of another.181 However, when fiduciaries can waive
their fiduciary duties without any real bargaining, “the practical alternatives
for a skeptical investor are often stark: invest without adequate protection
against self-dealing or avoid the asset class altogether.”182 If a manager is
able to convince investors to sign an operating agreement without fiduciary
protections, and if issues later arise, not only will the investors lose money
on their investment, but they may also be deterred from investing in the future
or they may turn to hiring legal representation, “either of which
systematically raises the cost of capital and reduces economic activity.”183
As such, default fiduciary duties serve to safeguard and incentivize a flow of
investment pivotal to business growth and success.184
For similar reasons, there must be some minimum standard of
accountability to which managers are held in their fiduciary capacities. Firms
are weakened by low managerial responsibility.185 Ultimately, safeguarding
investments and holding managers accountable through a default fiduciary
duty regime go hand in hand and are central to achieving public policy efforts
as they serve as “prerequisite[s] to a healthy market economy.”186 Overall,
fiduciary duties not only comport with traditional common law principles of
fairness and equity, but also protect unsophisticated parties, level the playing
field, and serve broad policy goals in the business environment at large. As
such, the court’s default fiduciary duty holding comports with precedent,
protects unsophisticated parties to the most popular business entity of our

180. Miller, supra note 123, at 1613.
181. Despres, supra note 175, at 1351–52; see Ribstein, supra note 5, at 542 (“The beneficiary
is willing to trust the fiduciary’s discretion because the fiduciary’s skills can enhance the value of
the beneficiary’s property.”).
182. Despres, supra note 175, at 1375 (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren
Song of Unlimited Contractual Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND
ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 12 (Mark J. Loewenstein & Robert W.
Hillman eds., 2015)).
183. Molk, supra note 122, at 2133.
184. See Despres, supra note 175, at 1375 (explaining that bargaining often does not occur in
alternative entity formation, which makes fiduciary duties pivotal in encouraging and protecting
investment).
185. See Surendra Arjoon, Virtue Theory as a Dynamic Theory of Business, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS
159, 159 (2000) (finding that ethics-driven strategies improve a company’s financial performance
more than profit-driven strategies).
186. Kleinberger, supra note 140, at 738–39.
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time, and maintains a more equitable, and therefore more robust, business
environment for Maryland.
B. The Maryland Court of Appeals or the Maryland General Assembly
Should Clarify the Extent to Which Parties May Opt Out of Default
Fiduciary Duties by Operating Agreement
The Court of Appeals used Plank to correctly recognize default
fiduciary duties in the LLC context and to permit parties to opt out of such
duties by way of operating agreement.187 However, the court came short of
clarifying the extent to which parties may validly opt out of such fiduciary
duties. Where the duty of loyalty, duty of care, and implied covenant of good
faith all exist by default in the legal backdrop, it is imperative that parties
know which of these duties may be waived.188 Parties can rely on this
affirmative knowledge during contracting to ensure that their operating
agreements are enforceable.189 Further, this clarification would prevent
upsetting party expectations and decrease future litigation costs from disputes
based on interpretive errors.190 This Note proposes that in its clarification,
the Court of Appeals or the Maryland General Assembly should make
waivable by operating agreement the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,
while leaving immutable the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.191 In doing so, Maryland would preserve a business-friendly
environment and avoid jurisdictional competition with Delaware while
balancing an equitable business environment for Maryland parties and their
LLCs.192
1. The Fiduciary Duties of Care and Loyalty Should Be Waivable
Both the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty should be waivable by
parties in an LLC operating agreement in Maryland. As argued below, there
is strong reason to allow for such broad waiver powers. First, the duty of
care is largely toothless and rarely litigated, greatly reducing any real impact
of permitting its waiver.193 Second, the duty of loyalty, though important,
poses a pricey risk for business structures that do not need it.194 Because

187. Plank v. Cherneski, 469 Md. 548, 231 A.3d 436 (2020).
188. See infra Section IV.B.1.
189. See infra Section IV.B.1.
190. See Harner & Marincic, supra note 3, at 884 (“The divergent views about the fiduciary
nature of LLCs create uncertainty and additional cost for parties electing to do business in the LLC
form.”).
191. See infra Section IV.B.1.
192. See infra Section IV.B.2.
193. See infra Section IV.B.1.i.
194. See infra Section IV.B.1.ii.
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there is greater flexibility in LLCs, the “costs and benefits of fiduciary duties
vary from firm to firm” and parties are better positioned than the courts to
decide which duties suit their business needs.195 Indeed, to have “[o]verly
burdensome mandatory rules” would be to “undermine the key comparative
advantage of the LLC organizational form.”196 Finally, in maintaining the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, parties would still have an
instrument by which to litigate, maintaining a last-resort option for aggrieved
parties, even in the absence of the duties of care and loyalty.197
i. Waiving the Duty of Care
The duty of care requires fiduciaries to manage the business “with the
care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances”198 by requiring managers to consider “all material
information reasonably available” before making business decisions.199
However, the duty of care is largely considered toothless due to the business
judgement rule.200 Under the business judgement rule, courts must presume
that decisions are made by fiduciaries “who have become duly informed
before exercising judgement, and who exercise judgment in a good-faith
effort to advance the company’s interests.”201 Thus, only evidence meeting
the high bar of self-dealing or gross negligence in the decision making
process can rebut the business judgement rule, resulting in a trend where duty
of care breaches are litigated far less often than duty of loyalty breaches.202
The duty of care has in many ways developed in this manner to avoid
holding managers to a level of unachievable perfection.203 As a practical
matter, without the business judgement rule, every business decision made
by management would be vulnerable to suit wholly dependent on the

195. Ribstein, supra note 5, at 594.
196. Molk, supra note 122, at 2137.
197. See infra Section IV.B.1.iii.
198. Daniel Buchholz, Eliminating Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLCs: A Process Focused
Approach to the Analysis of Waiver Provisions, 16 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 153, 158 (2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
199. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citation omitted).
200. See Buchholz, supra note 198, at 158 (explaining that “management is often shielded from
liability under the business judgement rule” because “[o]nly evidence of gross negligence in the
decision-making process on the part of the defendants will rebut the business judgement
presumption of due care”).
201. Id.
202. See id. at 159 (noting that the duty of care is litigated “far less often” than the duty of loyalty
due to the “wide array” of common law and statutory protections afforded to management).
203. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 83, 85 (2004) (emphasizing the value of the business judgement rule in protecting the authority
of managers, which in turn enables businesses to “adopt efficient decision-making systems and
processes”).
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opinions of the other members.204 In fact, one of the most prevalent
justifications of the business judgement rule is that its deference allows
managers to confidently make decisions based on their position and
expertise, even when such decisions may implicate risk, because risky
endeavors are often financially rewarding.205 As a duty built in many ways
on the foundational principle of managerial protection, the duty of care
generally lacks bite and is almost never litigated, which leaves little
consequence to permitting its waiver.
ii. Waiving the Duty of Loyalty
Waiving the duty of loyalty is more complex. In essence, the duty of
loyalty requires management to avoid conflicts of interest.206 But there are
legitimate reasons for LLCs to waive the duty of loyalty, particularly where
the firm does not fit the mold of a typical LLC entity.207 For example, as the
diversification of business ventures increases in popularity, so do the odds of
violating the duty of loyalty.208 This largely follows the rise of “emerging
sources of capital, such as private equity, venture capital, or spin-off
transactions, [that] may subject their financial sponsors to fiduciary duties in
profound conflict with either their larger business plans or with fiduciary
obligations they owe to other business entities.”209 These innovative and
complex structures have catalyzed “overlapping lines of business,” such as
between a parent company and its subsidiaries, which have in turn stressed
the “canonical ‘undivided-loyalty’ model” that underpins the traditional
notions of business associations.210 Ultimately, the duty of loyalty creates an
expensive regime riddled with litigation211 and inefficiencies212 for business
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Buchholz, supra note 198, at 159.
207. See William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1683, 1726
(2021) (noting, in the corporate context, that Chinese corporations prefer to avoid Delaware law
because the self-dealing prohibition under Delaware’s fiduciary duty regime conflicts with the way
business is done in China, often through intricate social networks that are likely to trigger selfdealing violations under American law).
208. Pace, supra note 148, at 1090.
209. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2017).
210. Id. at 1093.
211. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response
to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (1990) (recognizing that “fiduciary
duties . . . expose the corporation to costly litigation”).
212. Molk, supra note 122, at 2139 (“The mandatory duty of loyalty provides a remedy for selfdealing by management, but that remedy comes at the cost of expensive litigation and deterring
actions that can benefit the firm. In these instances where the costs of the protection exceed its
benefits, mandatory rules from corporate law saddle firms with inefficient provisions that increase
their costs of doing business.” (footnote omitted)).
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structures that simply do not need it.213 Because parties can shop for LLC
law,214 parties that attach a high cost to the imposition of fiduciary duties,
particularly the duty of loyalty, will avoid forming in jurisdictions that levy
such mandatory duties.215
iii. Leaving Intact the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
As its name suggests, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is implied in every contract,216 entailing an “obligation that neither party will
do anything to injure or destroy the right of the other party to receive the
benefits of the agreement.”217 Agreements between parties are only
enforceable as contracts if there is consideration, or a “mutual intent to
benefit.”218 Otherwise, the agreement is merely a gift, unenforceable as a
contract without the vital element of consideration.219 In the highly
contractual LLC context, it is pivotal that a strong covenant of good faith and
fair dealing exist. To be sure, without a robust implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, LLC agreements would “resemble a gift of members’
property to those in control of the enterprise who would be free to use the
entity’s property as they saw fit.”220 Thus, it is important that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing remain immutable in LLC operating
agreements.
Courts have discretionary authority in applying the covenant, and the
implied obligation of one party grows with the dependence of the other.221 In
other words, when one party is heavily dependent or reliant on the other,
courts can imply “promises or terms imposing fiduciary duties or quasi
fiduciary duties” through the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.222 This
malleability and consideration of dependency positions the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing as not only a safeguard for unsophisticated and highly

213. Pace, supra note 148, at 1088.
214. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
215. See infra Section IV.B.2.
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) (“Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).
217. SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:22 (4th ed.
1990).
218. DeMott, supra note 143, at 1060.
219. Id. at 1061 (“Anglo-American contract doctrine has not enforced executory promises to
make gifts because such promises do not contemplate an exchange.”).
220. Id.
221. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 217, § 63:21.
222. Id. (“[D]epending on the surrounding circumstances—the most significant being the extent
to which one party is dependent on the other, or to which the parties are mutually interdependent—
the courts will imply one or more terms to supplement the parties’ contractual undertakings . . . .”).
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dependent parties, but also a doctrinal protection that possesses a flexibility
that well-matches that inherit of the LLC entity.
Where the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing remains
immutable, afflicted parties will still have a “catch-all” claim to litigate
extreme harms—though concededly under a breach of contract claim rather
than under a breach of fiduciary duty claim.223 This last-resort option
maintains an equitable judicial remedy for parties, even where their operating
agreement is devoid of the protectionary duties of care and loyalty.224 As
such, its undisputable importance makes clear that allowing a full waiver of
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty must be supported by a strong
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Indeed, “[i]t is the unwaivable
protection of the implied covenant that allows the vast majority of the
remainder of the LLC Act to be so flexible.”225
2. The Internal Affairs Doctrine and LLCs
Delaware is perhaps best known for its domination of the corporate legal
market in the United States.226 Delaware’s grasp on corporate law is bred by
an acceptance of a conflict of laws principle called the internal affairs
doctrine, a doctrine that “enables corporations to opt into any state’s
corporate law simply by incorporating in that state.”227 Though the internal
affairs doctrine was born of case law in the corporate law context, it is now
well recognized that the internal affairs doctrine also applies to LLCs.228 In
the LLC context, the internal affairs doctrine allows LLCs to opt into the LLC
state law of their choice by simply forming in the jurisdiction that has the
laws they prefer. Because parties can effectively shop for the most businessfriendly laws to apply to their LLCs, states face jurisdictional competition as
223. Examples of breaches that can be held to be violations of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing include fraud and inequitable conduct, acting in bad faith, and dishonesty. Douglas M.
Branson, Alternative Entities in Delaware—Re-introduction of Fiduciary Concepts by the
Backdoor?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 55, 61 (Mark J. Loewenstein & Robert W. Hillman eds., 2015)).
224. See Pace, supra note 148, at 1140 (supposing that a court could construe the contractual
covenants of good faith and fair dealing broadly to effectively bypass any waiver or absence of
fiduciary duties).
225. R&R Cap., LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, No. CIV.A.3803-CC, 2008 WL
3846318, at *20 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2008).
226. See William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1418
(2020).
227. Id.
228. See Matthew G. Dore, Déjà Vu All Over Again? The Internal Affairs Rule and Entity Law
Convergence Patterns in Europe and the United States, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317,
347 (2014) (“As more and more states adopted LLC and LLP laws through the 1990s, and certainly
as more and more LLC and LLP statutes expressly embraced the internal affairs rule through foreign
qualification provisions, concerns ultimately subsided about application of the internal affairs rule
to foreign LLCs and LLPs . . . .”).
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they seek to maintain a favorable legal environment that encourages LLC
formation within their state.229
Research shows that the landscape for jurisdictional competition for
LLCs resembles that of corporations: Delaware versus all other states.230 In
the LLC context, most firms are formed in the state where their principal
place of business is located.231 However, research shows that the larger an
LLC is, the more likely the LLC is to be formed outside of the LLC’s
principal place of business, with Delaware as the primary destination of
choice.232 This reveals an important point: If it is presumed that smaller LLCs
are relatively unsophisticated, and that LLCs increase in sophistication as
they increase in size, then it appears that unsophisticated parties likely do not
know about the internal affairs doctrine or their related ability to shop for
more favorable LLC state law. This highlights the importance of an opt-out
regime that recognizes fiduciary duties where unsophisticated parties are
simply filing in the state of operation because they are unaware of the
alternatives. On the other hand, sophisticated LLCs do have a choice, and
they know it.
As such, Maryland is competing with Delaware because sophisticated
Maryland LLCs know that they can shop for more favorable laws elsewhere.
While this competition is best described as “defensive,” as given Delaware’s
dominance, states are more focused on retaining local business than luring
businesses away from Delaware, the choice for LLCs searching for a place
of incorporation is once again clear: home state versus Delaware.233 But if
Maryland maintains a default fiduciary duty regime that allows parties to opt
out of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, it will create an LLC regime
parallel to that of Delaware. By doing so, Maryland would likely be able to
alleviate jurisdictional competition concerns by emulating the LLC laws of
Delaware and thus leaving nothing to be desired or “shopped” for in other
state laws.
3. Striking the Balance Between Parties and Businesses
A party’s ability to waive its fiduciary duties is not hindered by the
presence of default fiduciary duties. With an already large portion of LLCs
contracting out of fiduciary duties, the sophisticated party clearly holds the

229. See id. (noting briefly that the internal affairs rule facilitates jurisdictional competition).
230. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional
Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 94 (2011).
231. Jens Dammann & Matthias Schundeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies Formed?
An Empirical Analysis, 55 J.L. & ECON. 741, 743 (2012).
232. Id. at 773.
233. Roberta Romano, The Market for Corporate Law Redux 9 (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 270/2014, 2014).
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power and knows how to wield it.234 If it can be generally assumed that the
party favoring the waiver of duties is the party with higher bargaining power
and greater sophistication, then their ability to waive such duties is not
impeded by the default laws of the jurisdiction.235 However, unsophisticated
parties may not necessarily know the full scope of their options, or how to
bargain into favorable terms, augmented by their lack of legal
representation.236 Thus, an opt-out system strikes an impressive balance
between ensuring a business-friendly environment, while protecting parties
and investors.
There is a demonstrated need for Maryland to protect unsophisticated
parties to LLC transactions. There is also a demonstrated need for Maryland
to retain an LLC-friendly regime to combat jurisdictional competition,
namely with Delaware. This Note suggests that the solution to this apparent
paradigm is to allow for the maximum extent of contracting in a default
fiduciary duty or opt-out system. The combination of default fiduciary duties
and the full freedom to contract out of all such duties effectuates a system
that offers compelling and satisfactory prospects to both the state and to all
players in an LLC transaction.
V. CONCLUSION
In Plank v. Cherneski, the Maryland Court of Appeals correctly held
that managing members of an LLC owe common law fiduciary duties to the
LLC and its minority members and that breach of fiduciary duty claims may
be brought as independent causes of action.237 The court’s recognition of
default fiduciary duties in the Maryland LLC context is pivotal to protecting
unsophisticated parties and effectuating broad business policy goals.238
However, the court’s holding did not go far enough as it failed to delineate
the extent to which parties to an LLC may waive their fiduciary duties by
operating agreement.239 This gap creates room for Maryland to match the
business-friendly policies of Delaware. To do so, Maryland should allow
parties to waive their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by operating
agreement.240 This clarification could be effectuated either by the state

234. See, e.g., Harner & Marincic, supra note 3, at 924 (finding that managers “may hold
substantial leverage in negotiating the Operating Agreements”).
235. See Miller, supra note 152, at 495 (explaining the presumption that sophisticated parties are
able to effectively read, understand, and negotiate the terms of a written agreement).
236. Miller, supra note 150, at 322.
237. 469 Md. 548, 231 A.3d 436 (2020).
238. See supra Section IV.A.
239. See supra Section IV.B.
240. See supra Section IV.B.

1328

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1302

legislature through the Maryland LLC Act,241 or by the judiciary clarifying
the holding in Plank.242 Doing so will not only maintain a business-friendly
approach and reduce the risk of jurisdictional competition, but it will also
uphold a default regime fundamental to an equitable judicial environment,
crafting the perfect balance between business-friendly and party-friendly.

241. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS, § 4A-101(l) (West 2020).
242. 469 Md. 548, 231 A.3d 436 (2020).

